Lefort/Dante: Reading, Misreading, Transforming by Revel, Judith
  
https://doi.org/10.37050/ci-16_04
 
 
Claude Lefort, Dante’s Modernity: An Intro-
duction to the ‘Monarchia’. With an Essay by
Judith Revel, ed. by Christiane Frey, Manuele
Gragnolati, Christoph F. E. Holzhey, and
Arnd Wedemeyer, trans. by Jennifer Rush-
worth, Cultural Inquiry, 16 (Berlin: ICI Ber-
lin Press, 2020), pp. 87–108
JUDITH REVEL
Lefort/Dante
Reading, Misreading, Transforming
CITE AS:
JudithRevel, ‘Lefort/Dante:Reading,Misreading,Transform-
ing’, in Claude Lefort, Dante’s Modernity: An Introduction to
the ‘Monarchia’. With an Essay by Judith Revel, ed. by Christi-
ane Frey, Manuele Gragnolati, Christoph F. E. Holzhey, and
Arnd Wedemeyer, trans. by Jennifer Rushworth, Cultural In-
quiry, 16 (Berlin: ICI Berlin Press, 2020), pp. 87–108 <https:
//doi.org/10.37050/ci-16_04>
RIGHTS STATEMENT:
© Judith Revel
© Jennifer Rushworth for this English translation
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
ABSTRACT: How can a reader from 1993 attend to a text from the
1310s? This question haunts the text Claude Lefort devotes to
Dante’s Monarchia. It is certainly a question of returning to the
content of Dante’s essay, but also of nourishing contemporary re-
flection: reading a text also means yielding to inquiries that do not
always belong to it, and testing, by this deformation and trans-
formation, its fruitfulness for today. Can one thus oppose to the
government of the One something that would be more like a com-
munity of ones? Can one hear in Dante the sketch of a thought of
the common?
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Lefort/Dante
Reading, Misreading, Transforming
JUDITH REVEL
In recent years, I have become very interested in Claude
Lefort from the point of view of contemporary philosophy
— more particularly, contemporary political philosophy
and contemporary representations of history, which are
the two areas of enquiry with which my own work is con-
cerned. It is therefore from this specific vantage point —
both situated and defending its evident subjectivity— that
I will suggest some points for reflection based on Dante’s
Monarchia and Claude Lefort’s reading of that same text.
Accordingly, this vantage point, which is that of a reader,
and is therefore subject to all the biases which inform
every act of reading, also includes the ways in which Lefort
himself misreads Dante’s text and in so doing makes it so
excitingly complex. Every reading, however philological, is
an exercise in cutting up and reinvention. Lefort does not
have any philological aspirations, and nor — much more
modestly, nearly a quarter of a century later—do I. Rather,
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we share the intention to bring a text to life by making
it one’s own, probably by misreading and transforming it,
and by making the questions that it formulates and the
proposals that it puts forward resonate in the present. ‘We
must digest what we read; otherwise it will merely enter
the memory and not the reasoning power’,1 writes Seneca
to Lucilius on the subject of the exercise of recollecting,
remembering, and ordering things read which make up
the hypomnemata. The brief essay in reading a reading —
reading the reading that Lefort so brilliantly offers us of
Dante — which I would like to undertake here has no
other aim than that outlined by Seneca: namely, the mod-
est digestion of two potent subject matters, embedded one
within the other, theDanteanmaterial and its Lefortian re-
elaboration.
The first point which I would like to address as a way
into Lefort’s reading is methodological in nature, and con-
cerns precisely the questionof reading, that is, the question
of what we mean by reading a text. Part of the purpose
of this point is likely that of protecting Lefort from even-
tual criticisms which medievalists or Dante specialists —
note that Lefort is neither of these — might otherwise
level against him. Nonetheless, the ‘defensive’ nature of
this point should not prevent us from understanding that
it also corresponds to a serious challenge on the part of
Lefort, and one which he puts into practice in his reading
of Dante just as in his reading ofMachiavelli, or in his read-
ing of texts by Marx. This challenge consists in affirming a
mode of reading that is rooted in the present, and aims in a
way to enact a return to the present. This mode of reading
1 Seneca, Epistles, trans. by Richard M. Gunmere, 3 vols (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996–2001), ii (2001), p. 281 (from
Letter 84) [translation amended].
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is proposed not in place of a philological reading that all of
us very often practise in relation to ‘our’ authors or to the
corpus of texts which we confront, but rather alongside, or
in addition to that reading approach.
When he justifies theoretically the principle of such
a presentist mode of reading, Lefort paradoxically articu-
lates it in terms of the importance of a historicizing gesture
which is, for him, never able to be renounced. Now, his-
toricization paradoxically implies the development of two
approaches which are both distinct and complementary:
on the one hand, the restitution and analysis of past sys-
tems of thought (in the case with which we are concerned,
this particular system of thought is itself rooted in other
systems of thought, startingwith the Aristotelian notion of
the ‘possible intellect’, which is a key focal point for much
of Lefort’s commentary, but also including ‘the writings of
important Christian authors’,2 from Augustine toThomas
Aquinas); on the other hand, the concomitant, constantly
reaffirmed desire to situate oneself in relation to one’s own
present, because the present cannot be grasped in its spe-
cificity save in the play of oppositions and continuities,
whether partial or total, which qualify it as such.
The present can thus be understood through a pro-
cess of differentiation, on the basis of what it no longer,
or no longer entirely, is. But it can also be understood
through the effects of continuity and the echoes elicited
by the description of a former time, that is, a scene of past
thoughtwhich seems on the surface radically different. In a
historical, philosophical, political landscape, there one day
arose a particular inaugural moment, a sort of moment of
emergence — Lefort speaks of ‘an immense step beyond
2 Lefort, ‘Dante’s Modernity’, in this volume, pp. 1–85 (p. 3).
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the field of ancient philosophy’.3 It is this novelty which
needs to be located and analysed, which is also its own
‘germination’, what has come down to us, seven centuries
later. Precisely because in our own time its belated echo
can still perhaps be heard. ‘Dante’smodernity’, since that is
the title of the essay by Lefort which accompanies the text
of theMonarchia, as a consequence includes both his status
as a point of rupture and his ability to talk, even today,
about us.
Lefort briefly cites Kantorowicz — Chapter VIII of
TheKing’sTwoBodies, ‘Man-centeredKingship:Dante’4—
in the opening pages of his own essay, and comments:
Dante shows himself to be so dependent on the
knowledge and language of his time that the reader
can easily overlook the ‘slant so new and so sur-
prising’ that he gives to all the statements that he
has borrowed and miss his intention and the new
solutions that he offers.5
If this is the difficulty, Lefort also makes the wager that
we should be less concerned about failing to grasp
the full extent of his borrowings — through lack
of the competences of the historian or the theolo-
gian— or of the use he makes of the debates about
the relations between religion and philosophy. For
in this case our confidence in the vigour of his
thought, or, to use an image dear to Dante, its
fecundity, is only increased.6
3 Ibid., p. 6.
4 ‘Man-Centered Kingship: Dante’, in Ernst H. Kantorowicz,The King’s
Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 451–95.
5 Lefort, ‘Dante’s Modernity’, p. 7.
6 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
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The principle of reading is as a result largely redefined, be-
cause there is no political analysis — whether it concerns
an author (Machiavelli) or a text (in this case, the Mon-
archia) — without the central importance of an inquiry
into the present; but there is also no conflation of these two
‘times’, which reading brings into tension, into a totality
tasked with revealing their truth. Any ambiguity can be
resolved by going back to the extraordinary opening essay
of the first issue of the journalLibre, founded by Lefort and
others in19777—anarticlewhose title, ‘Now’, also sounds
in itself like a declaration of intent:
That the historical dimension must be rescued
along with the political dimension does not mean
that we want to restore a theory of universal
history. We reject the viewpoint that stands over
and above the social totality as well as the vision
of the becoming of humanity as a self-generating
evolution or succession of ‘formations’. We also
reject the notion of a substance called ‘Society’ and
that of a full timeor of a continuumofmeaning.The
term ‘historical dimension’ is advanced precisely
in order to avoid the equivocation attached to the
idea of history; in order to suggest that there is
no way of understanding the manifestations of
social reality in the present which does not also
presume their apprehension in time […]. This
means that modern society (in the plural) cannot
be placed into history like an actor’s gestures and
words are placed at the proper moment in the plot.
Modern society must be known in its historicity,
through events that are not simply constellations
of accidents but which are shaped by modern
society, thus revealing its relation to change, a style
7 Lefort, ‘Maintenant’, Libre, 1 (1977), pp. 3–28, English as ‘Then
and Now’, trans. by Dick Howard, Jean Cohen, Patricia Tummons,
Mark Poster, and Andrew Arato, Telos: A Quarterly Journal of Radical
Thought, 36 (1978), pp. 29–42.
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of discriminating past and future — or an inability
to fall back wholly on acquired knowledge or an
excessiveness which is conducive to the test of
what invalidates it.8
What this means is that if interest in the present is not
enclosed within the narrow confines of a presentist ap-
proach which forgets both the sedimentary thickness of
its own ground and the horizon of projects to come (I am
thinking here of the recent analyses of François Hartog, to
which Lefort’s approach does not seem to correspond at
all),9 this same interest does nonetheless imply something
like ‘a style of discriminating past and future’, or, in other
words, the identification of moments of transformation
and change, entirely freed from a totalizing vision and yet
entirely effective.
What the present enables us to think, andwhat the his-
toricization of the enquiry — whether it is philosophical,
philological, political, or sociological—gives us themeans
to understand, is the specificity of a configuration which
is both produced by its own historical conditions (which
need to be described) and irreducible to an overarching
interpretation given in advance.The insistent commentary
that Lefort provides of the notion of civilitas is an excellent
example of this: ‘let us not be afraid to translate this as civil
society’, notes Lefort.10 In this note, we have both a record
of what Lefort identifies as the novelty of Dante (since
human society exceeds the restricted limits of Aristotelian
community) and, at the same time, the connecting thread
which emerges between civilitas and humanitas—in other
8 Lefort, ‘Then and Now’, pp. 41–42 [translation amended].
9 François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of
Time, trans. by Saskia Brown (New York: Columbia University Press,
2015).
10 Lefort, ‘Dante’s Modernity’, p. 4.
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words, according to Lefort, the relinquishing of a Thom-
ist vision of humanity understood on the grounds of the
idea of original sin, and its replacement by the positivity
of a collective effort at the realization of humankind’s hu-
manity, the secularization of theChristian idea of universal
community, and the echo, so to speak in advance, of the
modern representation of a community of the human race.
One last point in this rather long introduction devoted
to what is meant by reading. The necessary historicization
of the investigation that we undertake at a particular mo-
ment— since 1312 is neither 1993, the date of publication
of Lefort’s text, nor is it 2019, our own present moment—
is in reality also what gives us the greatest freedom in our
use of the authors that we mobilize. Not because the art
of commentary would suddenly be freed from its funda-
mental concern of respect for the text or its literalmeaning,
but rather because every single thought is produced in a
context which shapes it and which that thought in turn
helps to elucidate. It is in discussing his relationship to
Marx that Lefort is most explicit about this strange gesture
that constitutes reading:
No matter what help one can derive from com-
mentators, to read Marx is to question him (an
effort that today is becoming increasingly difficult,
it is true).This freedom requires one: to accept the
indeterminacy that accompanies the movement of
writing; to test its gaps, its new beginnings in sub-
sequent texts; to be willing to discover a thought
being worked on by what it grasps, to let oneself be
led to what it grasps; to let oneself thus be drawn
to the questions that made Marx speak, questions
which he made prominent and which are not con-
cealed by his answers, since it is not a matter of
problems and solutions. And the liberty that is so
gained increases with the very reading, which leads
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readers to confront their own time, that which they, in
turn, must grasp in their own place, now.11
If we replaceMarx’s namewithDante’s, it seems tome that
this passage offers us the key to Lefortian commentary:
[…] to let oneself thus be drawn to the questions
that made Dante speak, questions which he made
prominent and which are not concealed by his an-
swers, since it is not a matter of problems and solu-
tions. And the liberty that is so gained increases
with the very reading,which leads readers to confront
their own time, that which they, in turn, must grasp in
their own place, now.
This extraordinary lesson in reading contains at least two
important elements. The first is that at the heart of the act
of reading there is no intention of obtaining from the text
anything like an immutable truth, the truth-of-the-text-
and-its-author, because the only truth that can be found
therein is the patient effort of writing which accompanied
the work of thought of which the writing took charge. To
call this ‘indeterminacy’, as Lefort does, does notmean that
a text, precisely because it is indeterminate, would be en-
dowedwith a universal value,would all of a sudden erase its
context, the process and eventual errancies of its own con-
stitution, and could suddenly go forth under the auspices
of its own truth— let us recall Althusser’s ‘scientific’Marx,
against which the Lefortian method seems here openly to
take a stance. ‘Indeterminacy’ is quite the opposite, and
means situating thought once more in the context of its
effort and its tensions, that is to say also in the context of its
own history; it means analysing its determinations, and at
the same time feeling free to confront afresh, in its wake, in
11 Lefort, ‘Then andNow’, p. 32. Emphasis added [translation amended].
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the very same gesture, one’s own time—a time which does
not need to affirm the literal, identical repetition of what
was in reality the time of Marx, or the time of Machiavelli,
or the time of Dante… — but which is committed quite
simply, as Lefort says, to confronting one’s own time and
grasping what one designates precisely as ‘now’.
I would like now to suggest a few points where we see
this double aspect of reading: situating thought oncemore
within the context of its effort and its tensions, grasping its
novelty, of course; but also putting its propositions literally
to work in our own time, and seeingwhat they tell us about
ourselves.
I will highlight two such moments in particular, both
of which essentially relate to Book I of theMonarchia. The
first point, which is central for Dante, and whose potency
Lefort develops, concerns the reference to thepossible intel-
lect; beyond Lefort, I will propose an interpretation of the
possible intellect in terms of the constitution of the common
of human beings.12 The second, which is more Lefortian
but which is in a way projected by Lefort onto Dante’s
12 [Translator’s note: As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note in
their preface to Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire
(New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2004), the notion of ‘the com-
mon’ is ‘more awkward’ than that of ‘the commons’, but also signals
a new development with a different philosophical content (p. xv).
The article by Judith Revel and Antonio Negri, ‘Inventer le com-
mun des hommes’, Multitudes, 31.4 (2007), pp. 5–10 <https://doi.
org/10.3917/mult.031.0005> was translated as ‘Inventing the Com-
mon’ (2008) <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_revel5.htm>
[accessed 8December 2019].A key term inMichaelHardt andAntonio
Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2009), the notion
of the common has since also appeared in book titles, including Pierre
Dadot and Christian Laval, Commun: Essai sur la révolution au xxie
siècle (Paris: La Découverte, 2014), English asCommon: On Revolution
in the 21st Century (London: Bloomsbury, 2019) and, most recently,
L’Alternative du commun, ed. by Christian Laval, Pierre Sauvêtre, and
Ferhat Taylan (Paris: Hermann, 2019).]
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text, is the very complicated question of the One, in other
words, the difficulty of claiming simultaneously the coher-
ence, cohesion, and power of a collective intellect reliant
upon the idea that in reality humanity has no outside, that
humanity is made up of heterogeneous peoples who are
sometimes opposed, and at other times unaware of each
other, but all ofwhomcontribute to theprogressive realiza-
tion of the knowledgeable nature of the human race, on the
one hand; and, on the other hand (this is the other side of
this difficult simultaneity), what Lefort has always clung to
as a fundamental point of his analysis, that is, the fact that
the One, when it involves self-identity, the suppression of
differences, and the erasure of conflicts, is politically death-
bringing, and represents, putting it in modern terms, the
always possible turning-point of democracy into its oppos-
ite. All this immediately begs a question: is it possible to
construct an idea of universality which would not immedi-
ately mean affirmation of the One? Dante is here an in-
valuable guide, precisely because the Monarchia develops
the idea of a cooperative universality, or rather redefines
universality not as the ground for human community but
rather as what human cooperation is liable to constitute,
and accordingly reverses the logical order: universality is
an effect of cooperation, and not its condition of possibility.
In any case, this— and I will return to this point moment-
arily — seems to me to be what fascinates Lefort about
Dante: the possibility of a universality without the One.
Let’s take the first of these two points: the astonishing
adoption and re-elaboration of the Aristotelian theme of
the possible intellect. I will discuss this theme quite quickly
and do not want to insist on aspects that are well known
—Dante’s sidestepping of both Aristotle and theThomist
tradition. Because, as Lefort emphasizes in his essay, un-
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like Aristotle, Dante does not limit himself to imagining a
restricted community, defined by a delimited space, whose
limited character would enable precisely the expression of
what is in fact Aristotle’s real question: the organization
of the natural sociability of human beings. For Dante, not
only is there no limitation but there can be no such limita-
tion, precisely because the human race includes, as Lefort
explains, ‘nations of different sizes, peoples who do not
know each other, who are exposed to different climates
and attached to their particular customs, and whose unity
rests on their common submission to the jurisdiction of a
monarch’.13 Lefort goes on to quote the following passage
from Book I of theMonarchia:
whatever constitutes thepurposeof the civil society
of the human race […] will be here the first prin-
ciple, in terms of which all subsequent propositions
to be proved will be demonstrated with sufficient
rigour; for it would be foolish to suppose that there
is one purpose for this society and another for that,
and not a common purpose for all of them.14
The overlaying of humanitas and civilitas is clear here, and
immediately redefines what we are to understand by uni-
versality; the universal end or cause, so Lefort informs
us, is that of humanity understood as all human beings to-
gether. Universal society is no longer exclusively that of
13 Lefort, ‘Dante’s Modernity’, p. 6.
14 Dante Alighieri, Monarchy, ed. and trans. by Prue Shaw (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 5 (I, ii, 8 [trans-
lation amended]). [Translator’s note: All quotations throughout are
taken from this translation, which is now also available online
at <https://www.danteonline.it/monarchia> [accessed 5 December
2019]. Among the material of this website devoted to the Monarchia
is the Latin text of Shaw’s critical edition: Dante Alighieri,Monarchia,
ed. by Prue Shaw, Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Dante Alighieri a
cura della Società Dantesca Italiana, v (Florence: Le Lettere, 2009).]
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the Church, but rather that of unified humanity; it stems,
as Gilson had already highlighted in his Dante the Philo-
sopher15 — a text which guides Lefort’s commentary a
great deal —, from the secularization of the ideal of uni-
versal Christendom.
Dante’s second sidestep concerns Thomism. ‘“[T]he
necessity which requires humans to communize the re-
sources of their individual reason”’16 now functions at the
level of temporal society, not — or not only — because
earthly life is now valued for its own sake, but because it is
in this life that the end which is proper to humans can be
realized.The possible intellectmeans, as a consequence, the
presence and realization of God, who is cause and end, in
the interaction between humans themselves. But this com-
munizingof resources is also a formof interaction, because,
if humanity has its own end — the actualization of the
intellective power —, the individual itself is insufficient,
for it is only from the cooperation of all individuals that
this actualization can be achieved. Another quotation from
Dante:
And since that potentiality cannot be fully actual-
ized all at once in any one individual or in any one
of the particular social groupings enumerated above,
there must needs be amultitude in the human race,
throughwhom thewhole of this potentiality can be
actualized.17
This cooperation betweenhumanbeings, betweennations,
between peoples, needs of course to be understood as sub-
15 Étienne Gilson, Dante the Philosopher, trans. by David Moore (Lon-
don: Sheed &Ward, 1948).
16 Ibid., p. 166 [translation amended], cited by Lefort, ‘Dante’s Modern-
ity’, p. 5.
17 Dante,Monarchy, I, iii, 8. Emphasis added [translation amended].
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ject to the condition of unity (the unity of the monarch).
But cooperation is itself subject to the constitution of a
unitary model, a unity which is rendered by Dante in the
form of a body — the multitude representing from this
perspective all themembers of this body. Now, this organic
character, to which I will return shortly, allows for a two-
fold operation. The figure of the Church as the body of
Christ is here replaced by that of the body of humanity
whose unity is in God alone (and whose actualization is
reliant upon the rule of one alone, the monarch). But the
organicity inferred by the image of the body also enables
the relationship which is established between the mem-
bers themselves to be qualified as cooperation, in other
words, as reciprocal dependency: the necessity for each
person, in their uniqueness, and directed by one alone (the
monarch), to actualize, that is, to constitute along with
everyone else, the possible intellect. The concept of the
One-body is built on the basis of a bringing together of the
singularities of which it is formed— the term ‘singularity’
is here deliberately ‘imported’, but I accept the risk —,
which means that the disappearance of these singularities
is never required. Lefort immediately grasps the import-
ance of this fact: ‘Although already present previously, the
thought of the one proves to be more profound than that
of the whole.’18 Here, the one and the wholemean entirely
different things: no doubt this is what allows us to under-
stand the way in which Lefort will try against all the odds
to create a sort of mirror construction of the Dante of the
Monarchia and of the La Boétie of the Discourse on Volun-
tary Servitude. Indeed, how is it possible not to bring into
conflict Dante’s assertion that unity (the unity of human-
ity in God) must be realized under the rule of one alone
18 Lefort, ‘Dante’s Modernity’, p. 15.
100 LEFORT/DANTE
(the monarch) and La Boétie’s obsession with the Against
One? Perhaps by disconnecting, or by distinguishing, that
which relates to unity (understood as the articulation of
unique ones, as the cooperation of the multitude) from
that which relates to the whole (understood as the erasure
of the unique ones and the reduction to identity). This is
what seems to be demonstrated by the analyses which Le-
fort has devoted to political translations of the dynamics of
the whole, from the very start of his intellectual output on-
wards. For proceeding through totalization, asserting the
violence which at once covers and reduces the whole also
means giving a name, in the modern period which is ours,
to the network of totalitarian regimes on which Lefort has
worked so extensively.
It is of course necessary to emphasize here, since it
is one of the aspects which marks Dante’s distancing of
himself from Aristotle, the way in which the question of
the limitation of the ideal community in space is wholly
transformed: the civil society of the human race, universal
civilitas, knows of no spatial limits. But the same obser-
vation also pertains to that other fundamental dimension,
history, which much of Book II explores from the days of
Rome. For the actualization of the possible intellect also
requires a stratification in time: the multitude of members
who coexist and cooperate is constituted by a succession of
gestures and knowledges, which accumulate slowly. These
are quite literally the ‘waves’ of human activity, whose sedi-
mentation gives birth to human history as the realization
of the telos of the human race — a realization which is
conceivable only in this history, as a result of sedimentary
deposits and successive layers of stratification. In this his-
tory, the classical authors have their place, just asDante has
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his— and just as we, who read Dante today, probably have
our own place too.
Lefort, whose attachment to history I have already
sought to highlight at the start of this essay, is particularly
attuned to the thickness of history (an expression which, for
Lefort, in fact comes from Merleau-Ponty) — a thickness
which Lefort finds precisely in Dante. Lefort notes: ‘Let
us recall what Dante says in the Convivio: “And all our
troubles, if we really search out their origins, derive in
some way from not knowing how to use time.”’19 This
remark can be read in two ways: on the one hand, we
need to read Dante in the same way that Lefort wanted
to read Machiavelli, allowing his oeuvre to unfold as work,
which evidently implies an essential thickness of time; on
the other hand, the actualization of the possible intellect
requires the participation of all people throughout time.
It is in this regard that Dante is astonishingly modern:
history becomes here the milieu in which the affirmation
of humankind’s humanity (humanitas) in its political form
(civilitas) is conceived. And Lefort himself concludes his
own text by exhorting us to know ‘how to use time’.20
I announced at the beginning of this essay a second
set of questions, which are certainly rooted in Dante’s text
but which are also largely projected onto it from Lefort’s
emergent obsession with the critique of the One, in all its
forms (wemightmention, byway of example, self-identity,
society’s closing in on itself, the erasure of social conflict,
the State-form, party structures, the historical emergence
of totalitarian regimes, and so on). If one searches for it
19 Ibid., p. 48, citing from Dante Alighieri, Convivio: A Dual-Language
Critical Edition, ed. and trans. by Andrew Frisardi (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2018), iv, ii, 10.
20 Lefort, ‘Dante’s Modernity’, p. 85.
102 LEFORT/DANTE
within the sphere of political thought, the philosophical
root of this radical critique is represented for Lefort by the
figure of La Boétie, to whom he devotes an essay, in 1976,
designed to accompany a new edition of the Discourse on
Voluntary Servitude — whose full title, we must remem-
ber, is the Discourse on Voluntary Servitude or Against One.
Seventeen years later, when ‘Dante’s Modernity’ is first
published in French, it is oncemore the figure of La Boétie
who returns and who comes into tension with the text of
theMonarchia.
The context of this confrontation is clear, since both
texts are in reality a response to one common question:
what is the basis for the power of one alone? Of course,
the responses of Dante and La Boétie to this question
stem from two diametrically opposed points of view. And
yet Lefort complicates the play of oppositions, because
everything in reality seems to revolve around a different
problem: what are we to understand by the word one?
What does it mean? To what does it refer? Having noted
that, according to La Boétie, people, through their desire,
and soon their will to servitude, ‘give in to the charm of
the name of the one alone’,21 some sort of unity must
also be recognized amongst humans, without which their
common humanity would lose all its consistency. Lefort
underscores the difficulty that La Boétie faces: humans
have something in common, but they are also ‘irreducibly
distinct’.22Humanity is one, but how are we to understand
this unity without relating it immediately to the power of
one alone? And even before that: how are we to maintain
the singularities which constitute it? The answer given by
the Discourse rests on a sort of reworking of the notion of
21 Ibid., p. 80.
22 Ibid., p. 81.
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a mould. There is one same mould from which all people
are fashioned, because Nature placed in each of them a
common ground, which La Boétie explains as follows:
Hence, since this kind mother has given us the
whole world as a dwelling place, has lodged us in
the same house, has fashioned us according to the
same model so that in beholding one another we
might almost recognize ourselves; since she has
bestowed upon us all the great gift of voice and
speech for fraternal relationship, thus achieving by
the common andmutual statement of our thoughts
a communion of our wills […].23
The common is, in other words, the extraordinary possi-
bility of affirming at the same time the communion and the
differences. Each singularity does not negate the possibility
of recognizing the other (precisely because what we have
in common is that we are absolutely singular; the common
is, here, that of the difference that each of us irreducibly
represents); language, which we share, accordingly makes
the expression of different voices possible, which in turn
also makes possible the communion of wills. Humanity is
indeed one, but this unity is only conceivable to the extent
that it immediately implies the interrelationship between
the irreducible singularities that we are. Lefort therefore
comments:
The visible sign of union is deceptive: in truth,
nature has made us not so much united [unis] as
all ones [uns]. However, individuals only discover
themselves as ones [uns] through the relationship
with those with whom they share their life.24
23 Étienne de La Boétie, Anti-Dictator: The ‘Discours sur la servitude
volontaire’ of Étienne de La Boétie, Rendered into English, trans. byHarry
Kurz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 14.
24 Lefort, ‘Dante’s Modernity’, pp. 81–82. Emphasis added.
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In the essay which Lefort devotes in 1976 to La Boétie, an
essaywhose title is in and of itself a declaration of openwar
— ‘The name of the One’ (the One has, in Lefort, gained
its capital letter: it is clearly the enemy)—, things are even
clearer, and it is important to highlight at least two aspects
of that analysis, since they prefigure in a troubling way the
commentary on Dante’s text which concerns us here.
The opposition, which also recurs in Lefort’s 1993 es-
say, between being united (that is, constitutingOne, under
the rule of one alone) and being ones [uns] (in the plural) is
alreadypresent, and is evenput forward in a set and radical-
ized form. First of all, in a negativemanner, because it is not
enough to imagine, in front of the One, an other, in a way
its Other, nor can the problem be solved by setting society
in front of the power of the One (the power of one alone).
Thinking that society can be a sort of counterbalance to the
One can only mean one thing: that our understanding of
society ‘is embodied as theOne, that the plural, denying it-
self, is swallowed up in theOne’.25Here there is the danger
of that closing in on itself of the social which can make
it reproduce in a specular fashion what it had in contrast
thought to oppose, whereas it ends up merely imitating
those characteristics. Lefort knowswell that the logic of the
One is not only tenacious but also insidious: ‘a tenacious
illusion, it is true, from which it is perhaps impossible to
free oneself entirely, since in the end it is difficult not to talk
about the People, and to resort to a name which is attractive
25 Claude Lefort, ‘Le Nom d’Un’, in Étienne de La Boétie, Le Discours de
la servitude volontaire, ed. by Pierre Léonard, intro. by Miguel Aben-
sour and Marcel Gauchet, accompanying essays by Pierre Clastres and
Claude Lefort, with additional texts by Félicité Lamennais, Pierre Le-
roux, Auguste Vermorel, Gustav Landauer, and Simone Weil (Paris:
Payot, 1976), pp. 247–307 (p. 292).
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in it being in the singular’.26 Perhaps we should remember
this warning more often today, and ask ourselves what are,
today, all the ‘names which are attractive in their being in
the singular’ and which structure our own relation to the
political.
But the radicalization of Lefort’s position is also posi-
tive, and it goes back to the question of the commonmould
of humans — to their common humanity —, and specific-
ally to the question of language. The ‘same mould’, the
‘same form’, do not mean, in La Boétie, something like an
identity of human nature which would in advance reduce
any possibility of difference. On the contrary, it is the com-
mon capacity for differences (which is what each of us is)
to create connections and to communicate— returning to
Dante for amoment, to cooperate—which constitutes here
the common of human beings.
The theme of concord is essential here, and it is
no doubt one of the obvious connecting points between
Dante and La Boétie. Dante in fact writes in a surprising
passage:
It is clear then that everything which is good is
good for this reason: that it constitutes a unity. And
since concord, in itself, is a good, it is clear that it
consists in some unity as in its root. What this root
is will appear if we consider the nature or meaning
of concord, for concord is the uniform movement
of several wills.27
Of course, it is possible to turn these lines into a commen-
tary celebrating the one as what is good, and pull Dante
towards what in fact the title that he himself gave to his text
26 Ibid., p. 293.
27 Dante,Monarchy, I, xv, 4–5.
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already signals: the power of one alone, the One as prin-
ciple and commandment — literally, monarchy. But if, as
Dante also indicates in this same passage, the condition of
possibility of this unity ofwills is placed inwhat is the cause
and end of humanity — the realization of the possible
intellect —, in this case concord becomes the measured
andharmonious cooperation ofwills in all their differences
in the interaction assumed by that concord. Here we come
close to La Boétie’s analyses: concord is that which must
be constructed by interrelating differences, in a making,
in a set of practices which literally produce the common.
Concord is not the foundation of human relationships but
rather the effect of their constantly shifting interactions.
Lefort, in a wonderful page of his 1976 essay, lingers
in particular over one specific sentence of the Discourse.
This sentence is the same one that he will return to in
1993 inhis commentary on theMonarchia.Wehave indeed
received, as he recalls repeating La Boétie, ‘the great gift of
voice and speech for fraternal relationship, thus achieving
by the common and mutual statement of our thoughts a
communion of our wills’.28 Lefort then comments:
In fact, thinking about the fact of language, we
are already thinking about the separation and
the bringing together of subjects, we are already
thinking about the enigmatic event of freedom,
which supposes along with the mutual declaration
of thoughts to each other the moment of a will
to speak whose conditions cannot be found in
an earlier state, and whose origin is to be found
neither in individuals, since it is in order to speak
that they are ones [uns], nor outside of them,
since it is with and through each other that they
speak. Thinking language means already thinking
28 La Boétie, Anti-Dictator, p. 14.
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the political, freed from the Illusion of the One.
For asserting that the destiny of humans is to
be not all united [unis] but all ones [uns] means
reducing the social relationship to communication
and the reciprocal expression of agents, mutually
welcoming on principle the differences, arguing
that difference is not reducible except in the
imaginary and, at the same time— let us not forget
to note this —, denouncing the falsehood of those
in power who claim that the union of their subjects
or of their citizens is the sign of the good society.29
But then, without unity, are we doomed to discord? We
know Lefort’s answer: to admit that the interplay of dif-
ferences, that conflictuality, what he will call the ‘original
division of the social’, all amount to discord would be
to forget what we have learnt from Machiavelli, from La
Boétie, and no doubt also from Marx (if we do not re-
duce him to what orthodoxMarxism has made of him)—
and even from Spinoza, on whom, however, Lefort never
worked.
The question then becomes: where doesDante belong
in this genealogy? The power and the beauty of the 1993
commentary stem precisely from the wager that Lefort
makes in this regard — it is tempting to add, against
the very evidence of Dante’s text. But we know, as Le-
fort reminds us, that reading is misreading, that reading is
transformative, and that readingmeans taking charge.Mis-
reading, transformation, and taking charge do not occur,
however, without proper foundations: there is indeed an
element on the basis of which turning Dante against him-
self, or redefining the unity of the possible intellect as
the common of differences and as the cooperation of the
ones, can indeed be upheld. This aspect is present in La
29 Lefort, ‘Le nom d’Un’, p. 292.
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Boétie, as well as in Dante, and it is precisely what Le-
fort aptly perceives. It is fraternity. In The Discourse, La
Boétie speaks about ‘fraternal affection’. Dante, in theMon-
archia, declares: ‘“Behold how good and how pleasant it
is for brethren to dwell together in unity [habitare fratres in
unum].”’30
What ends up emerging, as a result of this strange
diagonal line connecting fourteenth-century Florence and
sixteenth-century France, is that fraternity is the name of
that which escapes the individual and the One, that frater-
nity is the necessary third party between the freedom of the
ones and the equality of allwhich is at once the promise and
the guarantee of the common as a cooperation of singular-
ities.
Perhaps, then, if we remember Dante’s modernity and
if we pin our colours to thatmast, if wemake this fraternity
which unites us without erasing each of our singularities
our very own, the realization of a civilitas worthy of the
humanitas which we share becomes conceivable.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY
JENNIFER RUSHWORTH
30 Dante,Monarchy, I, xvi, 5, citing here from Psalm 132, v. 1 according to
the Vulgate numbering, or Psalm 133, v. 1, in the Authorized Version.
Emphasis added.
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